

# SETTING OUR COURSE

## IN THE TERROR WAR

### SYMPOSIUM REPORT

CENTER FOR NAVAL  
WARFARE STUDIES  
DECISION STRATEGIES  
DEPARTMENT  
Report 02-2



Report Documentation Page			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188		
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE <b>OCT 2001</b>		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>Setting Our Course in the Terror War</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>Naval War College,Center for Naval Warfare Studies,Decision Strategies Department,Newport,RI,02841</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES <b>The original document contains color images.</b>					
14. ABSTRACT <b>see report</b>					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>36</b>	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			

**Setting Our Course In the Terror War  
Symposium Report  
29-31 October 2001**

---

United States Naval War College  
Newport, Rhode Island

---

For further information regarding this report please contact Prof. Lawrence Modisett,  
NWC Commercial phone 401-841-4057 (DSN 948), [\*\*modisettl@nwc.navy.mil\*\*](mailto:modisettl@nwc.navy.mil)  
This report is also available on the classified internet (SIPRNET) at [nwdc.navy.smil.mil](http://nwdc.navy.smil.mil)

## *Foreword*

**RADM Rodney P. Rempt, USN**  
**President of the United States Naval War College**



On 11 September 2001, the United States suddenly found itself at war, a war unlike any it had previously fought. The enemy was deployed around the globe, yet as close as our own backyard. The methods he would use, and the targets he would choose, were unbounded by international law, conventions of war, or regard for human decency. With no government of their own, the terrorists would rely for support on nations sympathetic to their cause, or simply desirous of doing harm to the United States and its allies. If we allowed it to go unchecked, that support could eventually include providing terrorists with the most destructive weapons yet devised by mankind.

This new war poses unprecedented challenges for U.S. armed forces, none more so than our maritime services. The United States Navy and Marine Corps were already grappling with how to maintain required levels of readiness in a time of constrained budgets, while simultaneously transforming themselves to prepare for future challenges. Now, they suddenly faced a host of new questions: how to balance the need to protect America's homeland and the need to maintain sufficient presence overseas to ensure global stability and prosperity. The need to work with other services and civilian agencies in operations requiring an unprecedented sharing of information and resources is clear, often with the Navy playing a supporting role. One key question is how do we integrate the lessons of this new war into the ongoing debate over what to change and what to preserve as we position ourselves for the future?

To help address these questions, the Naval War College conducted a symposium, "Setting Our Course In the Terror War," 29-31 October 2001. We were fortunate to have as participants some very senior leaders, including the Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Vernon E. Clark, USN; the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, ADM William J. Fallon, USN; the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, ADM Dennis C. Blair, USN; and the General Counsel of the Navy, the Honorable Alberto Mora. Speakers and panelists addressed a host of issues raised by the changes in the strategic and operational environment that resulted from the events of 11 September. They offered some solutions and raised even more questions. The discussion was candid and, in keeping with the new situation in which this country found itself, willing to challenge conventional thinking.

Given the range of issues addressed, and the willingness of participants to broach new ideas, this report is offered in the hope that ideas it contains will contribute both to the ongoing campaign against terror and to deliberations over the long-term future of the Navy.



## **Table of Contents**

Foreword by RADM Rodney P. Rempt, USN.....	i
Executive Summary .....	1
Symposium Report.....	5
Agenda.....	23
Panels.....	27
List of Participants .....	29



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Naval War College conducted a symposium, "Setting Our Course In the Terror War," 29-31 October 2001. It featured a series of speakers and panels, including representatives from Navy, Coast Guard and Joint commands and civilian specialists. Key observations are highlighted below, by topic.

***Continuing value of sea power.*** Speakers and participants, including the Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Clark, noted that operations in Afghanistan had reaffirmed the enduring contributions of the Navy to U.S. power projection capability, including sovereign platforms, strategic reach, flexibility, and stealth.

***Need to balance roles, support USCG.*** ADM Clark and others underscored the challenge of balancing the continued requirement for forward deployments with the resumption of the Navy's traditional role of homeland defense, now undertaken in support of the Coast Guard. Participants recognized that the resource constraints of the Coast Guard, critical even before 11 September, require significant use of Navy assets. But one participant warned if diversion of assets significantly reduces the ability to operate forward, "we give our enemy a victory." Recommendations included coordinating procurement plans, revisiting the National Fleet concept, and continuing to activate Reserves, especially those with scarce specialized skills.

***Maritime intercept operations (MIO).*** Discussion of operations focused most heavily upon MIO. VADM McGinn, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs, offered the vision of a 2-3 year campaign that would eliminate the ability of an enemy to use the sea-lanes to attack the United States. Participants saw no significant military challenges to U.S. ability to conduct such operations. Citing a high success rate for container inspections in Rotterdam, they believed proper analytical methods could aid significantly in screening potential targets for MIO. They also believed ship seizures would lead to greater self-policing. Targets should include not only "floating truck bombs" but illegal trade used to finance terrorist networks. Participants saw ample legal grounds for conducting MIO against suspected terrorists, including Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Some believed rules of engagement require reevaluation.

***Logistics.*** Participants noted that in the current campaign, the key role of naval forces has been to provide a sea base for tactical air support and special operations. This is likely to remain so, since access to most land bases will remain problematic. Participants called for greater emphasis on "offensive operational logistics" and recommended the Navy consider Army Prepositioned Ships as an alternative platform, as the UK did in the Falklands. The Global 2001 war game demonstrated the value of doing transfers at sea from Maritime Prepositioned Force platforms to high-speed lighterage, but such operations face difficult challenges, including heavy seas, C2 connectivity, and missile defense of logistics assets ashore.



***Information operations (IO) and public diplomacy.*** ADM Clark cited information operations and public diplomacy as areas requiring "new thinking." Participants noted the endurance, signature control, and sovereignty of Navy platforms are advantageous for IO operations and called for a Navy component in U.S. IO strategy. ADM Fallon, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, cited the need to do better in matching IO preparations to expected challenges, such as non-literate audiences. The Honorable Alberto Mora, General Counsel of the Navy, noted parochialism among agencies hampers IO policy.

***Intelligence.*** Discussion of operational issues led to extensive discussion of intelligence requirements and capabilities. Much of it focused on the need to better exploit existing data bases by upgrading data mining tools, improving connectivity among government agencies, expanding exchanges with other nations, and reaching out to sources not traditionally tapped, particularly the commercial sector. Participants also warned, however, that expanded cooperation must be balanced against the need for operations security. Both General Counsel Mora and ADM Blair, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, noted there has been a relaxation of restrictions on information sharing between law enforcement and intelligence agencies. On collection, participants noted the Navy has given up much of its capability to the Joint world and cannot always count on those assets. They called for improving capabilities for persistent surveillance, using aerostats, Global Hawk, space-based radar, and combined radars. They also cautioned that collection systems built for blue water operations don't work well in the littoral. Participants noted the need to reexamine human source collection and strengthen analysis. Many emphasized the role of special operations forces (SOF) in intelligence collection, and some suggested it may be the primary role of SOF.

***International cooperation.*** Many participants commented on the importance of allies and coalition partners in anti-terror operations. ADM Clark cited the value of international cooperation to the Navy as it attempts to maintain global operations while devoting four aircraft carriers to combat missions. There was a general sense that U.S. policy emphasis had shifted from unilateralism toward coalitions which, in the words of VADM McGinn, may represent a "convergence of interests" or a "convergence of fears." Several participants cited as a model the "security communities" ADM Blair has fostered, where nations cooperate when they have mutual interests at stake, without making long-term binding commitments. ADM Blair particularly cited advances achieved in international cooperation through security assistance, training, and greater communications interoperability.

***Security.*** The need for security was another overarching theme. Both ADM Fallon and VADM Mullen noted that recent terrorist attacks, particularly on the *U.S.S. Cole* and the Pentagon, had fundamentally changed thinking among naval personnel, heightening the focus on personal and operational security. As threats to combatants, participants cited mines, shore-launched torpedoes, and high speed underwater weapons. They also noted that under-manning of security forces had made land bases more vulnerable, requiring reinforcement by personnel from other specialties.

***Continuing budget issues.*** Participants were not optimistic about future Navy budgets. ADM Fallon, VADM Mullen, and General Counsel Mora cautioned that any funding increases to fight terrorism were unlikely to relieve the long-term shortfalls apparent before 11 September when, in the words of the General Counsel, "managing the Navy was like managing a company in Chapter 11." Congressional Research analyst Ron O'Rourke warned that increased defense funding might not even cover needs arising directly from the current conflict. In allocating future spending, participants stressed the need to find the right balance between homeland defense and forward deployments, and between current operations and long-term investment. ADM Fallon recommended focusing resources on "high-value assets" related to information, engagement, access, and flexibility. One participant urged that cuts fall most heavily on "single-mission assets."

***Transformation.*** Recognition of the challenges posed by anti-terror operations and continuing budget constraints evoked numerous views on naval transformation. VADM Mullen noted a tendency of the Sea Services to resist change, "which is sometimes a good thing and sometimes not." He called for improving command, control, communications, and intelligence (C4I); defense against chemical and biological warfare; and logistics. Mr. O'Rourke argued that the Navy lacks a clear vision for innovation and this shortcoming undercut the DD21 program. Indeed, participants expressed widely diverse views on future surface combatants. They noted the campaign in Afghanistan has validated the utility of aircraft carriers, but they also extolled the performance of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and called for their wider deployment on a range of platforms. Mr. O'Rourke recommended deploying UAVs on SSGNs as well as surface combatants, acquiring a naval version of the AC-130 gunship, and developing large, deep-penetrating weapons that could be launched from naval platforms. One participant believed increased MIOs would require lighter, faster ships but also affirmed a continuing need for big ships to "send a message." VADM Mullen noted smaller ships would make it easier to maintain forward presence but raise issues of sustainability and force protection, and he called for more investigation of what is technically feasible. ADM Fallon noted "big decks" provide flexibility. Another participant suggested amphibious groups may replace carrier battle groups as the "universal force package."

***Acquisition process.*** Participants recommended changes in the acquisition process to increase speed in fielding systems, sharing information between systems, and integrating new technologies into existing systems. To speed the fielding of new systems, they recommended the acquisitions community provide contractors general performance requirements, rather than design details. To speed the exchange of information, often hampered by unique proprietary features, a standard interface should be defined. To leverage advancing technology, there should be separate acquisition programs for new classes of platforms, which take 10 or more years for first delivery, and electronic equipment, which advances in 18-month roll-overs. New equipment could then more easily be used to upgrade existing platforms. Participants also considered the possibility of downgrading military specifications and relying more on commercial technology, but they acknowledged such a proposal would have to consider carefully the additional risks.

***Deployments.*** Along with changes in platforms, weaponry, and acquisitions, some participants called for innovation in deployments. VADM McGinn suggested going from 6 to 7 month deployments, and ADM Fallon called for testing a Naval War College proposal for swapping crews and platforms to achieve greater efficiencies.

## **SYMPOSIUM REPORT : SETTING OUR COURSE IN THE TERROR WAR**

**Background:** The Naval War College conducted a symposium, "Setting Our Course In the Terror War," 29-31 October 2001. The symposium featured a series of speakers and panels, with representatives from Navy, Coast Guard and Joint commands and civilian specialists. An agenda and list of panelists are attached.

### **Day One (Monday 29 Oct)**

#### **Opening remarks. RADM Rodney P. Rempt, USN, President, Naval War College.**

RADM Rempt stressed that the United States is fighting a war unlike any it has fought before. Navy leaders look to institutions like the Naval War College for the innovative strategic thinking that cannot be done under the daily pressure of planning and conducting operations. He charged participants to be innovative, creative, and forthright.

#### **Keynote speaker. ADM Vernon E. Clark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations.**

ADM Clark addressed what has changed and what has not changed since 11 September and identified key challenges facing the Navy.

***What has changed and what has not.*** ADM Clark noted the non-traditional character of the enemy, a "trans-national organization dedicated to indiscriminate killing and terror." He also noted that the current conflict demonstrates the "timeless importance of sea power," with its ability to operate independently and sustain forward combat capability. He cited the strategic reach of current naval operations, attacking targets hundreds of miles from the sea. He also noted that the Navy has returned to its "traditional" role of homeland defense, with the unique feature that it is now supporting the Coast Guard in a time of war, a reversal of the historic pattern. He affirmed the continuing need to sustain credible combat power in theaters beyond the immediate conflict.

***Challenges.*** Urging his audience to "challenge all assumptions," ADM Clark identified areas requiring new thinking: force structure and packaging; deployment and crewing concepts; the balance between homeland defense and forward deployments; training; intelligence; command and control; relationships with non-government organizations (NGOs) and other services; research and development (R&D); and the role of the Navy in information operations and public diplomacy. Responding to questions, he stressed the importance of international cooperation as the Navy attempts to maintain global operations while devoting four aircraft carriers to combat missions.

**Panel One. Strategy Over the Next Five Years: Threats and Missions. Prof. Bradd Hayes, moderator.**

***Alternative scenarios.*** Professor Mack Owens, Naval War College, provided a scene-setting brief that described three scenarios. In the "Good Scenario," the U.S. achieves its military goals while retaining political support at home and abroad; the U.S. and global economies resume growth; and expanding prosperity deprives terrorist movements of recruits. In the "Bad Scenario," the war continues with no resolution in sight, a struggling U.S. economy puts a strain on resources, globalism gives way to protectionism, and terrorists strike more targets in Europe and the Muslim world, toppling regimes in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and elsewhere. In the "Ugly Scenario," events follow the same course as the "Bad Scenario," but major-power competition also returns.

The responses of panelists to these scenarios ranged from optimism to pessimism.

***Coalitions.*** Mr. Stephen Schlaikjer, Foreign Policy Advisor to the Chief of Naval Operations, was relatively optimistic. He noted that the scale of the September attacks made it easier for the United States to garner global support, including Russia, China, and Pakistan, and this would help us achieve our objectives. However, demonstrations of progress would be essential to keep coalitions together.

***State sponsorship.*** Prof. Ahmed Hashim, Naval War College, was more pessimistic. He complained that U.S. thinking had not shifted sufficiently and continued to talk about state-sponsored terrorism rather than transnational networks. Failing states permit terrorism, rather than sponsor it. Somalia, Sudan, Yemen and Algeria are disintegrating, which will complicate the war against terrorism.

***Basic challenges.*** Prof. Harvey Sapolsky, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was pessimistic for three reasons: the United States can do little to remove the root causes of terrorism, including the security concerns that require us to maintain forces in Saudi Arabia; it is difficult to keep U.S. public opinion focused on a war effort to which the public has little to contribute directly; and we are not good at nation-building, which must come from within.

***Arc of conflict.*** Prof. Peter Liotta, Naval War College, predicted continuing conflicts due to political, social, economic, cultural and demographic trends across a broad arc of the Middle East and South Asia. He noted that future clashes were as likely over scarce resources, including water, as cultural differences, and that "human security," including the war on disease, could become as great an issue as national security. He noted the limited effectiveness of military force in dealing with these problems.

***Effects on policy, force structure, and strategy.*** Mr. Hank Gaffney, CNA Corporation, noted a shift in U.S. policy from unilateralism toward coalitions, where "mutuality is key." He saw a refocusing of U.S. attention from Asia to an "arc of crisis" extending from the Levant through Pakistan, and an improvement in relations with Russia, with less

emphasis on missile defense. He noted U.S. military capabilities have not been an issue in the current campaign, and it is unclear how any changes would improve them. He suggested the lack of aggressive action by potential adversaries while the United States is preoccupied in Afghanistan has weakened the case for a two-war strategy.

***Nation building.*** In response to questions from the audience, Prof. Sapolsky repeated his skepticism about the wisdom of U.S. "meddling." Prof. Hashim distinguished between "nation-building lite" and "nation-building heavy" and said the United States must provide at least a modicum of security in post-war Afghanistan. Prof. Owens doubted the United States would be able to escape this task.

**Invited speaker. VADM Michael G. Mullen, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements and Assessments, N8.**

***Pressing issues for the Navy.*** Admiral Mullen noted that the attack on the *USS Cole* had fundamentally changed thinking about security by demonstrating a direct threat to Navy platforms and personnel. He underscored the need for long-term, in-depth thinking and war-gaming that leads to useful, focused results. He highlighted the following challenges: how to balance short-term requirements against longer-term needs, given the current tempo of operations; how to use our network effectively against the enemy's; how to manage risk in operations, public safety, and future threats; and how the Navy should transform. Regarding the last point, he observed that none of the "top ten" needs and requirements identified in a recent survey were addressed in current Navy programs.

***Transformation.*** In response to questions, Admiral Mullen noted the Sea Services tend to be "stubborn and independent" when faced with the need to transform. He particularly cited the need to do better in C4I, chemical and biological warfare, and logistics. He said his views on the National Fleet concept, which he previously opposed, had changed since 11 September. He suggested smaller ships could make it easier to maintain forward presence but raise issues of sustainability and force protection. He called for more "facts" on the "technology" of small ships.

**Panel Two. Navy Contributions to Homeland Defense. Dr. Ken Watman, moderator.**

***Maritime Homeland Security Operational Concept.*** CAPT Tom Crowley of the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) described the Maritime Homeland Security Operational Concept, available on the SIPRNET at [www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil](http://www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil) under "homeland security" and "recommendations." It defines the Navy's mission as deterring, detecting and defending against attacks on the United States from air or sea. The basic concept is layered defense, combining forward deployment with support to NORAD and the Coast Guard. CAPT Crowley noted that surveillance is best done from forward positions and emphasized the need to improve data collection and identify targets of interest. In the proposed command and control structure for operations near the U.S. coast, the Coast Guard is the supported command and operational control of CONUS naval space lies with CINCFCOM.

**Weekly war games.** Dr. Ken Watman, panel moderator and Director of the Naval War College's War Gaming Department, noted that CAPT Crowley's brief embodied some of the lessons learned during a series of weekly games examining the Navy's role in homeland security. These games have focused on identifying threats, distinguishing between hostile and benign platforms, and conducting interdiction operations, with attention to legal and intelligence issues. One major lesson has been the need to better exploit existing databases, where the U.S. government lags behind industry.

**Legal issues.** Discussion addressed the role of U.S. forces in police operations, the legal basis for intercepting and boarding suspect vessels at sea, and the treatment of terrorist suspects in custody. RADM Michael Lohr, JAGC, US Navy, noted that naval forces under Coast Guard tactical control have the authority to detain vessels. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense and Attorney General, with Presidential approval, can waive restrictions on naval search and seizure. RADM Robert Duncan, Chief Counsel to the Coast Guard, noted that terrorism is not on the list of internationally sanctioned activities, which include piracy, slavery, and unauthorized broadcast, suspicion of which is sufficient justification for boarding a vessel. One reason for its absence is disagreement over what constitutes terrorism. CAPT Crowley noted the United States can search suspect vessels under the right of self defense if the nation operating the vessel denies access. RADM Lohr confirmed that if we had credible intelligence, we could act to preempt an attack under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. RADM Duncan added, "We have plenty of authority to defend ourselves." There was discussion of what to do with Usama Bin Ladin if he is captured, including the possibility of trial in a Federal court or an international tribunal. One participant suggested such individuals should be considered mass murderers rather than terrorists.

**Information sharing.** Discussants cited significant gaps in connectivity, including Department of Defense networks. Canadian officers at NORAD cannot receive NOFORN intelligence. Radars operated by the FAA are not connected to NORAD. The Coast Guard and Navy have a shared intelligence center, but other agencies are not represented. On the positive side, the U.S. Customs Service has information sharing agreements with Canada and Mexico.

**Resource constraints.** Panelists noted that prior to 11 September the Coast Guard already faced severe resource shortages and its worst retention rate ever. This argues for increasing Navy support to the Coast Guard, but one participant warned if we give up our ability to fight forward by diverting Navy assets, "we give our enemy a victory." He recommended the Navy and Coast Guard jointly examine requirements and determine what to ask for. Mr. George Heavey, Executive Director of Operations, U.S. Customs Service, noted that the Service has extensive capabilities but faces a daunting challenge if terrorists take advantage of containerization as drug smugglers have done. The Customs Service is drawing upon its 8,000 uniformed inspectors to reinforce the U.S.-Canadian border, provide extra guards at airports, and increase security for the Winter Olympics.

**Briefing of opportunity. RDML Michael C. Tracy, USN, Commander, Navy Region Northeast/ Submarine Group TWO.**

RDML Tracy presented a classified briefing on how the submarine force can contribute to the Terror War, using its mobility, stealth and capabilities for monitoring, tracking, SOF delivery, and strike. He outlined how future force developments will increase these capabilities. His briefing is available on the SIPRNET web page for the Symposium at [www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil](http://www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil) .

**Day Two (Tuesday 30 Oct)**

**Invited speaker. Mr. Ron O'Rourke, Congressional Research Service.** The title of Mr. O'Rourke's presentation was "Long-Term Implications for the Navy of the Current Conflict." He addressed nine key areas.

***Programs vs. resources.*** The Navy should not assume that additional funding in response to the attacks of 11 September will close the gap between requirements and resources. The DoD budget will continue to face competition from domestic priorities predating the attacks, as well as new local government requirements and the need for an economic stimulus package. Any increased DoD funding is likely to be targeted at needs arising directly from the current conflict, such as PGMs, ISR, and UAVs. It may not even cover increased spending in those areas, leaving still larger gaps elsewhere.

***Transformation.*** Mr. O'Rourke saw no progress in this area since his previous visit to Newport sixteen months earlier. He blamed this on the absence of a clearly articulated concept or strategy for Navy innovation. One victim has been the DD-21 program, which was in fact transformational but was not so perceived because it lacked an intellectual framework.

***Network-centric operations.*** Expanding network-centric operations has become even more important since 11 September, with greater emphasis on expanding beyond the Navy and other services to include civilian agencies. This has procurement implications.

***Navy-Coast Guard relations.*** The events of 11 September will have a major impact on force planning, leading to a much larger Coast Guard that may include deep-water assets. This provides a new opportunity for the Navy to assess the advantages of coordinating procurement plans with the Coast Guard, revisiting the National Fleet concept. The new resource requirements facing an already strapped Coast Guard require a new era of Navy-Coast Guard cooperation. The Navy must support Coast Guard resource needs if it does not want to play a homeland defense role itself.

***Marine Corps and Amphibious Forces.*** The attacks in September raise a number of questions: What should be the Marine Corps' domestic role? How does the Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force fit with other response forces? What role should the Marine Corps play in providing security for overseas facilities? What are the implications for end strength? Should the pre-deployment training of Marine



Expeditionary Units (MEUs) be changed? Should SEAL deployments with MEUs be modified?

**Missile defense.** Some believe the terrorist attacks will downgrade the priority of missile defense in favor of putting resources against other areas of vulnerability; others believe the attacks reinforced the case for missile defense by demonstrating a threat. The mission will probably remain a high priority, but funding levels may be moderated by the need to strengthen counter-terrorist spending. Over the long term, missile defense will increase the demand for surface forces when the Navy is already stressed for platforms.

**Naval aviation.** Current operations have strongly validated the utility of aircraft carriers and strengthened the case for maintaining 12. The case for the Joint Strike Fighter may also be stronger, but non-stealthy aircraft have been performing well. At the same time, there is now a much stronger case for UAVs and UCAVs. Here the Navy's plans are much too timid. They call for just six UAVs per air wing by 2017, far short of the goal set by the Administration and Congress for UAVs to comprise one-third of the strike force by 2015. The Navy also needs to examine the question of reducing personnel requirements for aviation, as it is doing for surface warfare.

**Surface combatants.** The emphasis on homeland defense does not strengthen the case for DD-21, and the war in Afghanistan may weaken it, since its limited reach would not have allowed it to support ground forces. The Navy's own support for DD-21 has appeared ambivalent. An alternative might be to build additional DDG-51s. Even if the DD-21 is not cancelled, production is unlikely to exceed two per year, a rate that would eventually result in 80 or fewer surface combatants. New concepts under consideration include a DD-21 equipped with UAVs; smaller surface combatants on the Streetfighter model; and wider deployment of UAVs on existing surface combatants.

**Submarines.** The submarine community has shown innovation over the last decade but has been unable to gain a plus-up to procurements above one boat per year. It will be hard even to stay at the 55-boat level. Double crewing for attack submarines may be an option. Another is to expand Trident conversion from 4 boats to 6 or 8. SSGNs should carry not only cruise missiles but UAVs and UCAVs as well. Other options include expanding forward home deployments from 3 to 6 and extending service life for *Virginia* class SSNs to 40 years. A procurement rate of 1 1/2 to 2 per year could then maintain a force of 60 boats. The Navy should accelerate procurement of the Advanced Seal Delivery System (ASDS).

**Committee arrangements.** In response to a question, Mr. O'Rourke noted that Navy and Coast Guard funding are handled by different Congressional committees. Closer cooperation between the two services may require changing committee arrangements.

**Panel Three. Naval Offensive Counter-Terror Operations. Prof. Barney Rubel, moderator.**

The panel began with a briefing on current naval support to operations in Afghanistan. Prof. Rubel then offered a working definition of naval offensive counter-terror operations: "Operations conducted to disrupt terrorist operations or support other countries in doing so." Comments by panelists covered the following areas.

***Sea-basing.*** In the current campaign, the key role of naval forces has been to provide a sea base for tactical air support and special operations. This is likely to remain so, since access to land bases will remain problematic except in Kuwait and the United Kingdom (UK). We need to put more emphasis on "offensive operational logistics." The Navy should consider Army Prepositioned Ships as an alternative platform, as the UK did in the Falklands conflict. The Global 2001 war game demonstrated the value of doing transfers at sea from Maritime Prepositioned Force platforms (MPF) to high-speed lighterage. However, such operations face difficult challenges, including lighterage in heavy seas, C2 connectivity, and missile defense of logistics assets ashore.

***Information Operations (IO).*** Some Navy advantages in basing also apply to IO, including endurance, signature control, and sovereignty. The United States needs a national IO strategy that includes a Navy component. The Navy needs to focus more attention on encryption and wireless technology and on operations security (OPSEC). It needs to establish new OPSEC metrics.

***Speed.*** The Navy needs rapid reaction capabilities to respond to and preempt terrorist acts. High-speed vessels (HSV) may help meet this need.

***Acquisition.*** Speed is also important in acquisitions. This applies to the capabilities new systems must have, especially for connectivity and information sharing, and to speed in fielding new systems. The latter requires that the acquisitions community change the way it deals with contractors. We should specify general performance requirements, not design details. Because unique proprietary systems hamper integration, we need to define a standard interface. Digital targeting must be incorporated across systems.

***Intelligence.*** We cannot assume we know what we need to know. Databases must be better linked. The current campaign requires global intelligence, not just local and regional. The Navy has given up much of its collection capability to the Joint world, and we cannot always count on those assets. Collection systems built for blue sea operations don't work well in the littoral.

The primary mission of special operations may be intelligence gathering, not strike. Advanced Seal Delivery System (ASDS) operations can play a large role. The best intelligence comes from forces ashore.

Information sharing poses a major challenge. We must cooperate with civilian agencies, the private sector, coalitions, and allies, but against this need we must balance the requirement for operations security.

***Strike.*** Critical requirements for supporting special operations include intelligence, firepower, networks, air strikes and naval gunfire. Networks are critical to provide instant intelligence to shooters and receive instant feedback. Units should be squad-sized and empowered with laptops and other high-tech equipment. They should employ concepts like those developed at the Marine Corps War Fighting Laboratory to enable rapid data transfer for fire support. Networks must be 100 percent reliable and impenetrable. We don't need to transform to fight terrorists, just use current forces creatively.

The Navy should look into some things the Air Force is doing. The AC-130 gunship provides a loitering, high-accuracy platform. A similar system should be able to operate from a carrier; in fact, a C-130 has launched from a carrier. The Navy also needs to acquire large, deep-penetrating weapons.

***Maritime Intercept Operations (MIOs).*** The United States currently faces no challengers at sea; we own the seas and can conduct whatever operations we need. What we require is the legal framework to authorize seizing ships, holding crews, and selling cargos. Rules of engagement need to be reevaluated.

Selecting targets for MIOs requires spotting anomalies. Analytical methods used in Rotterdam have resulted in a 60 percent hit rate on containers inspected. Inspection is best done at the point of embarkation.

Along with floating "truck bombs," MIOs should target illegal trade, such as drug trafficking, whereby terrorists finance their networks. These operations would yield benefits in areas beyond the campaign against Al Qaeda, such as piracy. More effective policing would also relieve pressure on insurance rates, and seizing ships would lead to greater self-policing by shippers.

Helping other countries police the sea-lanes will mean a big engagement role for the Navy and Coast Guard. Effectiveness will require working with some "strange bedfellows." For international cooperation, a model might be CINCPAC's "security communities," where nations cooperate when they have mutual interests at stake, without binding commitments. Economic embargos have also created a well-developed international cooperation regime.

On the other hand, we don't want to apply measures so stringent they damage our economy. There are also problems with re-flagging and concerns about freedom of navigation.

**Invited speaker. ADM William J. Fallon, USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations.**

***Adaptability.*** ADM Fallon began by stating that we have talked a lot in the past decade about the naval services adapting, but they have mainly kept to the tried and true. This was the right thing to do in some cases but not in others. Now the threat has changed, and new measures of effectiveness are needed. Personal security ranks high among concerns and one challenge is to mesh instruments of security effectively. On the positive side, Navy-Coast Guard inter-operability and communication have progressed since 11 September and there is good recognition of how one can help the other; the idea of subordinating the Coast Guard to the Navy was rejected early.

***Alignment.*** There is a "crying need" to rethink resource and organizational alignments. We are organized to provide resources to the unified commanders, but the problem is worldwide. Operations in the north Arabian Sea showed quick adaptation, for which the way was prepared in the early 1990s. Changes in command and control may be required. Navy doctrine should remain flexible enough to accommodate change.

***Information operations.*** At the end of the day, we want to influence behavior. We need to do a better job of matching preparations to expected challenges. Psychological operations are an example. They must be better tailored to target non-readers. We ought to drive public opinion, not "steer by the wake." We should "go offensive."

***OPTEMPO and sustainment.*** Six-month ship deployments may have to go by the board. We have a lot of sustainability. Ideas developed by Naval War College participants in Task Force Sierra for swapping crews and platforms to achieve greater efficiencies should be fully tested and implemented if they make sense. Sustainability also requires a robust combat logistics force. To ensure continuity of operations we need to look at succession of command. Some commanders should probably be tapped to serve longer than normal tours in order to ensure transformational concepts are fully developed.

***ISR.*** ISR is fundamental, but it is "flooded with trash" and hampered by stovepipes. The latter need to be demolished "on a regular basis."

***Future needs.*** When this war ends, the Navy will face the same tough decisions it faced before 11 September, when it was "headed for bankruptcy." It must identify its real needs. Requirements that are too demanding drive up acquisition costs. High-value assets relate to information, engagement, access, and flexibility. Sovereign platforms provide engagement and access. "Big decks" provide flexibility.

***Unified Command Plan (UCP).*** Responding to a question, ADM Fallon said in order for the UCP to address the global nature of the terrorist enemy, regional CINCs must know their territory; the Service Chiefs must provide a global view and advise the CINCs.

**Panel four. Naval Operational Concepts Beyond the Terror War. Prof. Tom Fedyszyn, moderator.**

***The Quadrennial Defense Review and the Terror War.*** CAPT Sam Tangredi, National Defense University, provided a scene-setting brief that summarized the highlights of QDR 2001. He noted that in preparing for the next QDR, the Navy must determine to what extent forward presence will remain a force-sizing criterion. He then identified the following "Post-QDR 2001 Top Ten Debates":

- What is the Navy's role in Homeland Defense?
- What is the Navy's role in counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation?
- How should the Navy be sized -- for fighting a decisive war? For dissuasion?  
For presence?
- What is the future of forward presence; what does "forward presence" mean?
- What is Navy transformation?
- What is the future of strategic deterrence?
- What is the Navy's role in national missile defense?
- What is the Navy's role in space?
- What is the impact of anti-access, area denial strategies?
- What are the asymmetric threats to naval forces?

CAPT Tangredi's briefing slides are available on the SIPRNET web page for the Symposium at [www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil](http://www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil).

Panelists' comments focused on the following areas.

***Budget and force structure.*** Several panelists cited the observations by Ron O'Rourke and ADM Fallon on the Navy's budget plight prior to 11 September and the likelihood it would recur. One observed it would be budget figures, not the QDR, that determine the structure of the Navy. He later recommended reductions fall most heavily on amphibious ships and submarines. Another participant, however, suggested amphibious groups (ARGs) may replace carrier battle groups (CVBGs) as the "universal force package." Still another foresaw expanded roles for both CVBGs and ARGs, with the budget axe falling most heavily on programs that offer only single-mission capabilities.

Budget constraints were not alone in driving recommendations on force structure. One panelist saw increased maritime intercept operations leading to a requirement for lighter, faster ships, but he also affirmed the continuing need for big, heavy ships for the "message" they send. Another suggested equipping every combatant with Tomahawks to provide greater flexibility in assembling forces.

A panelist commented that the Navy needs to move from platform-centric to requirement-directed decision making. Another observed that the Navy lacks the ability to quantify risk and calibrate capabilities mixes, and internal communication is not good.

***Technology and acquisitions.*** One participant noted technology advances may contribute to future capabilities such as UAV launches from submarines, robotic weapons, and navy-based information warfare capabilities. However, another observed that acquisition procedures prevent fully leveraging technology. It takes 10, 12 or 14 years to deliver the first ship of a new class, but electronic technology advances in 18-month roll-overs. This suggests a need to buy "building blocks," not monoliths. Separate acquisition programs for "trucks" (platforms) and the equipment installed on them would allow a series of "switches." The Navy might also downgrade milspecs and rely more on commercial technology, but it must consider the risk to lives.

***Technology and personnel.*** One participant noted the Navy is always searching for personnel with skills in advanced technologies not predicted 15 years earlier. Career patterns, particularly for unrestricted line officers (URL), are very tight. Discussants suggested various responses to this problem, including limited appointments such as three-year commissions and short-term enlistments, and setting aside the up-or-out rule to retain scarce talents. One recommended crossing the lines between communities, such as putting aviators on UV-carrying surface ships.

***Sustainability.*** One participant estimated that with an agreed end strength of 376,000, the Navy could sustain the current level of operations without placing undue stress on personnel or hurting retention rates. The "crunch" is in junior officer aviators. On sustainability of platforms, a participant cited a CNA study that concludes the "real killer" is a campaign requiring four CVs, as opposed to two. He noted the sustainability of ARG commitments is also in doubt. Another participant suggested nuclear propulsion to increase sustainability of smaller platforms and reduce their fuel storage requirements.

***Security.*** Participants cited various threats to combatants, including mines, shore-launched torpedoes and high speed underwater weapons. They noted terrorist attacks have increased the priority of fully manning land bases. After 11 September, under-manning of these facilities required drawing personnel from other specialties to augment security forces.

***Navy contributions to homeland defense.*** Several participants noted the Navy can contribute medical services quickly. One cited untapped resources in the Reserves for security, linguistics, cryptology, explosive ordnance disposal, civil air patrols, detoxification, C3I, and information operations. He noted the Reserves are developing cyber-war capabilities.

***ISR.*** One participant offered recommendations for improvement in three areas. In **humint**, the Navy needs to reexamine collection assumptions and strengthen analysis. For **persistent surveillance**, it needs the capabilities of aerostats, Global Hawk, space-based radar, and combined radars. For **transferability of data**, it needs better SIPRNET connectivity with the Coast Guard and NORAD and the ability to establish secure networks on the unclassified INTERNET to connect with U.S. Customs and other civilian agencies. Another participant observed that for the current conflict the Navy must learn how to "lay a network down on a network."

**Invited speaker. VADM Dennis V. McGinn, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs, N7.**

***Duration of the conflict.*** VADM McGinn began by warning that although the war started in Afghanistan, no one expected it to end there. The enemy is persistent and the roots of terrorism deeply embedded. At the same time, the ability of the U.S. to react quickly and forestall further attacks demonstrated the enemy had miscalculated.

***End-state for the Navy.*** VADM McGinn challenged participants to define a desired end-state and a vision for getting there, focusing on what we do well. He then offered his own: a 2-3 year campaign led by the U.S. Navy that completely shuts down the capability of any enemy to use the sea-lanes to launch an attack.

***Intelligence.*** The first focus of the campaign should be building economic, political and military databases, drawing information from every potential source, including commercial firms. Subjects should include individual terrorists, weapons of mass destruction and their precursors, stinger missiles, explosives, and anything else that can sink ships or down aircraft.

***Operations.*** Armed with this information, the United States should engage in various operations, including information operations, covert and overt action, and maritime intercept operations. All draw on Navy core competencies and may be done unilaterally or in coalitions. Coalitions may represent a "convergence of interests" or a "convergence of fears." VADM McGinn provided examples of specific types of operations that would employ Navy core competencies and advanced technologies to identify and neutralize threats from the open seas. He noted that insurance underwriters and others could provide incentives to countries and companies to comply with requests for information that would help sift out suspects. These operations would have a positive effect on other forms of illicit trade as well, including arms, drugs, and illegal immigrants.

***Defending North America.*** Responding to questions, VADM McGinn endorsed the idea of a "maritime version of NORAD" involving Canada and Mexico, as well as U.S. Customs, and cited progress in cooperating with both countries. He said he assumes there are terrorist cells in the United States "with mission orders." The campaign he described would keep them from getting material they need to operate. He concurred on the need to protect cruise ships, a task the Coast Guard is already addressing.

***"Why we can'ts," resource issues, and security.*** VADM McGinn noted that the absence of a security threat had led to a high comfort level in the United States and the erection of legal and political barriers, "why we can'ts," that now must be challenged. Responding to a question about resource shortfalls, he said we can stop doing some things and shift resources to the war effort, and we can go after more money. We could also go from 6 to 7 month deployments. He concluded by urging participants to rethink whether they have sufficiently changed what they are doing in response to 11 September and to strengthen information and operations security.

### **Day Three (Wednesday 31 Oct)**

#### **Homeland Security Interdict/C2 War Game.**

Dr. Ken Watman of the War Gaming Department chaired a briefing by participants in this exercise, which ran concurrently with the symposium. Report-outs are available on the SIPRNET at [www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil](http://www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil), using the "HLS Navy Role" and "Wargame" links. The game examined three scenarios: a threat to a cruise ship, ship-borne toxic industrial materials, and a threat by air. It led to the following findings.

***Surveillance.*** Open ocean ISR on individual ships is inadequate, and Homeland Security-Maritime (HLS-M) assets would be stressed to sustain surveillance out to the 200 nm Maritime Defense Zone (MARDEZ) limit. There is a need for fixed wide-area sensors that allow end-to-end tracking out to 1500 nm.

Commenting on this portion of the brief, VADM McGinn recommended maritime defense incorporate the air traffic control model, employing similar protocols to eliminate non-suspect platforms and thereby reduce tracking requirements.

**C2.** The game highlighted several command and control issues: At what level and distance should the decision be made to engage a threatening platform? What ROE tripwires should apply? Who should give the decision to execute? Should this be a law enforcement or military operation? Should Navy or Coast Guard assets be used? Concern also arose over how to manage the transition from the open sea phases of an operation to HLS-M at 200 nm.

***Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF) model.*** The game considered the pros and cons of using the JIATF model for command and control of Homeland Security. Pros included unity of command and effort; established inter-agency buy-in; the depth and breadth of existing experience; broad fusion of intelligence; mature C4I structure and capabilities; the broad reach of JIATF assets and data; the ability to incorporate the assets and information of allies; and the functional orientation. Cons included the limits imposed by the CINC's AOR boundaries and the need to rely on multi-function assets that might be subject to other tasking.

**Invited speaker.** ADM Dennis C. Blair, USN, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command.

ADM Blair decried the "check list mentality" with which the United States had addressed force protection after previous terrorist attacks, missing the trend of increasing aggressiveness and sophistication and not starting soon enough to think tactically.

***Pacific Command (PACOM) response to 11 September.*** On the defensive side, PACOM is working with civil agencies, NORAD, and other governments, including Korea and Japan. On the offensive side, it has sent ships and aircraft to CENTCOM and



increased its anti-terrorist intelligence effort from four analysts to over 60. PACOM is working to remove barriers to information and intelligence flows within the U.S. Government. ADM Blair noted that a week before the symposium intelligence analysts had gained access to FBI files for the first time.

***Contributions of other countries in the region.*** Japan has changed its legislation to allow its forces to participate in the anti-terror effort; Korea is contributing troops and ships; Australia has invoked the ANZUS treaty; the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore are providing logistics support and allowing over-flights; Indonesia has joined the effort; discussions are underway with Bangladesh. ADM Blair also noted U.S. naval support agreements with India would be important to the campaign.

***Longstanding threats.*** ADM Blair noted that along with the anti-terror campaign PACOM faces additional challenges, which he called "our day job." These include tensions on the Korean Peninsula, periodically underscored by bellicose declarations from the North, and China's continuing assertion of the right to use force against Taiwan. He noted that when PACOM sent the carrier *Kitty Hawk* to support the effort in Afghanistan, it also deployed a squadron of F-15s to South Korea to maintain readiness. Other problems noted by ADM Blair included illegal immigration, internal violence in Indonesia and the Philippines, and illegal drug traffic into Thailand, which he described as part of a "seam of lawlessness" from Myanmar to Indonesia. This situation requires strengthening law enforcement agencies and militaries and their ability to work together.

***Areas of progress.*** ADM Blair called East Timor the most important area of multilateral cooperation in the last two years, with Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand having commanded forces there and the Japanese Self-Defense Force possibly joining the effort. PACOM is enhancing international cooperation capabilities in its AOR through security assistance, training, and greater interoperability in communications. It is also using war games with other countries to strengthen multilateral peacekeeping and non-contested evacuation operations. A multilateral exercise, Cobra Gold, focuses on counter-terror.

***Transformation.*** ADM Blair said he originally thought readiness, engagement and transformation would be separate activities, but in fact all three must be done at the same time. He noted the near-term gains possible through information technology, citing the demonstration in a recent exercise of a common, inter-service operational picture.

***UCP.*** Responding to questions, ADM Blair said the regional CINCs work well across the geographical "seams" that divide them; a "tougher seam" is the one between DoD and other agencies, such as the FBI, INS, and Treasury Department.

***Security cooperation.*** ADM Blair said cooperation has improved between the United States and both India and China as a result of common interests in opposing terrorism. Citing his article of 31 October in the *International Herald Tribune*, he said the campaign against terrorism is an example of a "security community," the model for international cooperation he envisions among Pacific nations.

***Navy-Coast Guard cooperation.*** ADM Blair said JIATF West has made great strides in counter-narcotics under Coast Guard leadership, particularly in sharing intelligence across "pipes," and provides a model for dealing with other threats.

***Peace-keeping.*** Asked what advice he would offer CENTCOM, ADM Blair said peace-keeping operations need not be led by the United States. We should provide what we do best, such as communications, logistics, and engineering. National participation should be organized functionally, not geographically.

### **Analytic overview of Symposium. Dr. Ken Watman.**

Dr. Watman's brief is available on the Symposium web page at the NWDC SIPRNET site, [www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil](http://www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil), under "Wrap-Up."

***Framing questions, alternate forms of warfare.*** Dr. Watman identified four questions that frame the issue: What kind of war are we fighting? How prominent a role will the military play? What roles will it play? What is the Navy's part? He then defined four forms a war against terror might take: Against crime; against guerrillas; against a state waging guerrilla war; and against an "alliance" of states waging guerrilla war. How we define what kind of war this is will determine how we fight it.

***Navy role.*** The more the war is an "away game" against states, the greater the role for the Navy. Sea power is of particular value in providing forward presence when time is critical; in providing access when land bases are not available; and in providing capabilities to conduct covert, secure operations. Terrorists have no ability to control the sea or even surveil it. In the "home game," we have achieved a rough division of labor between the Navy and Coast Guard. The highest probability of detecting terrorist maritime operations is at or prior to their embarkation. The key to accomplishing this is pulling together data from key existing sources, of which about 12 have been identified. Legal issues do not appear daunting for maritime operations.

***Resource issues.*** Both the Navy and Coast Guard were fully engaged and under-resourced prior to 11 September. Now they face the additional requirement of the Homeland Security mission. Four remedies are possible: Decrease the priority of other missions; get new resources; provide Navy support to the Coast Guard at potential cost to forward operations; and exploit existing resources, particularly the Reserves, more fully.

### **Invited speaker. The Honorable Alberto Mora, General Counsel of the Navy.**

General Counsel Mora addressed issues Secretary of the Navy England considers his highest priorities.

***Budget issues.*** Managing the Navy before 11 September was like managing a company in Chapter 11. Available funding could not support the force structure. Secretary England looked to save 10 percent from the "tail" for transfer to the "tooth." Since 11 September, old priorities seem more important than ever. The Navy expects more

resources but also faces new challenges, including force protection. Secretary England's first priority is to reform the budget process, which is too opaque, slow and unresponsive. He wants to increase transparency, integrate separate budget teams within the Navy, and achieve savings.

***Oversight.*** The Secretary's second priority is to implement Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's goal of pushing responsibility downward by improving oversight by the Service secretaries. The current conflict may accelerate this process, with the Senior Resources Oversight Committee the key mechanism.

***Transformation; the anti-terror campaign.*** Secretary England is also focused on transformation. He has taken to heart the President's admonition "never to forget" what happened 11 September. He realizes the campaign will be long and requires patience.

***Navy cooperation with law enforcement.*** General Counsel Mora has spent 40 percent of his time since 11 September on fusion of the Navy with law enforcement efforts. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) is now a front line unit, domestically and internationally. It has worked closely with the FBI since the *USS Cole* bombing. The two agencies share information, and their directors meet every morning. Responding to questions, he affirmed that restrictions on information sharing between law enforcement and intelligence agencies are relaxing.

***"Encroachment."*** General Counsel Mora also spends significant time on problems of "encroachment," especially environmental restrictions that inhibit Navy and Marine Corps training. In response to a question about Vieques, he said Secretary England does not believe we have to do all our training in one place.

***Security.*** General Counsel Mora noted that Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary England have been "outraged" by breaches of operational security, which have "seriously compromised" our ability to address the threat. General Counsel Mora has been working on non-coercive ways to discourage the publication of sensitive information.

***Public relations.*** General Counsel Mora said parochialism among agencies hampers formation of an effective information policy. Our efforts are ineffective in Arab-speaking countries, where U.S. broadcasting receives less funding than our broadcasts to Cuba.

**Concluding remarks. RADM Rodney P. Rempt, USN, President, Naval War College.**

RADM Rempt compared the current conflict with the Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars on several counts, including political support, and identified key challenges.

***Support for war effort.*** RADM Rempt noted that Congress approved the use of force in the Terror War by a much wider margin than it approved the use of force to oust Iraq from Kuwait, although the vote still fell short of the one approving the Tonkin Gulf

resolution. Initial international support is also high, comparable to that for the Persian Gulf effort, and includes the first invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, success over the long term may depend upon winning support from a skeptical or hostile Islamic world. The unity of the American people, which RADM Rempt called the "social dimension," is higher now than it was during either the Vietnam or the Persian Gulf War, but continued support will depend upon successes at home and overseas.

***Challenges.*** RADM Rempt noted the importance of matching strategy and policy, which was done poorly in Vietnam and posed far less of a challenge during the Gulf War than today. He defined U.S. strategic goals in the Terror War to include finding and eliminating global terrorists and their support organizations; stopping state sponsorship; ensuring homeland security; and encouraging other governments to support common interests. Other challenges include assessing what U.S. national and military interests have changed and which have not; defining our desired end-state; and making our strategy and policy understandable to the American people.





## Setting Our Course in the Terror War

US Naval War College  
29-31 October 2001

---

### Notes:

**Discussion on the first day will be at the unclassified level through the luncheon address and open to the news media. Beginning with the session at 1400 Monday, discussion will be at the SECRET level (except ADM Blair's unclassified address at 0930 Wednesday).**

---

### Day One (Monday 29 Oct)

---

0820	Admin remarks	Dr. Lawrence Modisett
0830	Introduction	RADM Rodney P. Rempt, USN President, Naval War College
0845	Keynote address	ADM Vernon E. Clark, USN Chief of Naval Operations <i>Naval Missions In the New Strategic Environment</i>
0945	Break	
1000	Panel	<i>Strategy Over the Next Five Years: Threats and Missions</i> Moderator: Prof. Bradd Hayes Scene-setting brief: The Security Environment Over the Next Five Years (Presenter: Prof. Mack Owens) <i>Group discussion; general discussion and Q &amp; A</i>
1200	Lunch	Officer's Club
1330	Address	VADM Michael G. Mullen, USN Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements and Assessments, N8
1415	Panel	<i>Navy Contributions To Homeland Defense</i> Moderator: Dr. Ken Watman Scene-setting briefs: NWDC Draft Operational Concept; Lessons from Homeland Security Series (Presenters: CAPT Tom Crowley, USN, Navy Warfare Development

Command; Dr. Ken Watman)  
*Group discussion; general discussion and Q &A*

1600 Break

1615 Briefing of Opportunity  
 RDML Michael C. Tracy, USN  
 Commander, Navy Region Northeast/ Submarine Group TWO  
*The Submarine Campaign*

1700 Conclusion of Day One

---

**Day Two (Tuesday Oct 30)**

0800-1600	War Game	Concepts of Operations [ <i>conducted in parallel to groups</i> ]
-----------	----------	---

0800 Admin remarks Dr. Lawrence Modisett

0815 Address  
 Mr. Ron O'Rourke, Congressional Research Service  
*Long-Term Implications for the Navy of the Current Conflict*

0900 Panel  
*Naval Offensive Counter-Terror Operations*  
 Moderator: Prof. Barney Rubel  
 Scene-setting brief: Update on current operations against Afghanistan (Presenter: CAPT Bruce Carter, USN)  
*Group discussion; general discussion and Q &A*

1045 Break

1100 Report on Panels  
 Summary of First Three Panels  
 Moderator: Dr. Lawrence Modisett  
 Prof. Bradd Hayes  
 Dr. Ken Watman  
 Prof. Barney Rubel

1130 Remarks  
 ADM William J. Fallon, USN  
 Vice Chief of Naval Operations

1200 Lunch  
 NWC Café

1400	Panel	<i>Naval Operational Concepts Beyond the Terror War</i> Moderator: Prof. Tom Fedyszyn Scene-setting brief: The QDR and the Terror War (Presenter: CAPT Sam Tangredi, USN) <i>Group discussion; general discussion and Q &amp;A</i>
1600	Break	
1615	Remarks	VADM Dennis V. McGinn, USN Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs, N7
1700		Conclusion of Day Two
1715	Reception	Mahan Rotunda

---

**Day Three (Wednesday Oct 31)**

Revised Schedule for Day Three

**Wednesday Oct 31**

**McCarty-Little Auditorium**

0815	Admin remarks	Dr. Lawrence Modisett
0830	War game	Brief-out of Scenario Two Dr. Ken Watman
0915	Break	

**Spruance Auditorium**

0930	Address	ADM Dennis C. Blair, USN Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command
1030	Break	
1045	Summary Brief	Analytic Over-View Dr. Ken Watman
1100	Remarks	Hon. Alberto Mora General Counsel of the Navy
1130	Concluding remarks	RADM Rodney P. Rempt, USN President, Naval War College







## **Setting our Course in the Terror War**

**US Naval War College  
29-31 October 2001**

### **Panel Members**

#### **Panel 1**

#### **Strategy Over the Next Five Years: Threats and Missions**

Moderator: Prof. Bradd Hayes

Scene-setting brief: The Security Environment Over the Next Five Years

(Presenter: Prof. Mack Owens)

#### **Members:**

Mr. Hank Gaffney, CNA

Prof. Ahmed Hashim

Prof. Peter Liotta

Prof. Mack Owens

Dr. Harvey Sapolsky, MIT

Mr. Steve Schlaikjer, CNO/POLAD

#### **Panel 2**

#### **Navy Contributions To Homeland Defense**

Moderator: Dr. Ken Watman

Scene-setting briefs: NWDC Draft Operational Concept;  
Lessons from Homeland Security Series

(Presenters: CAPT Tom Crowley, USN; Dr. Ken Watman)

#### **Members:**

RADM Michael F. Lohr, USN, N3/5L, NJAG

RADM Robert F. Duncan, USCG

RDML Miles Wachendorf, USN, N51

Mr. George Heavey, U.S. Customs Service

CAPT Tom Crowley, USN, NWDC

CAPT Bruce Stubbs, USCG (ret), Anteon

### **Panel 3**

#### **Naval Offensive Counter-Terror Operations**

Moderator: Prof. Barney Rubel

Scene-setting brief: Update on current operations against Afghanistan (CAPT Bruce Carter, USN)

#### **Members:**

RADM Harry W. Whiton, USN, Commander, Naval Security Group

RADM Steve Smith, USN, SECNAV/OPA

RADM Charles L. Munns, USN, Commander, Submarine Group EIGHT

RADM Daniel S. Mastagni, USN, SEVENTH FLEET

RDML Charles Johnston, USN, NAVAIRSYSCOM

RDML Miles Wachendorf, USN, N51

RDML Michael C. Tracy, USN, Commander, Navy Region Northeast/ Submarine Group TWO

RDML (sel) Robert T. Moeller, USN, CINCPACFLT N3/5/7

Mr. Ron O'Rourke, Congressional Research Service

CAPT Ronald W. Brinkley, USN, SWOS

CAPT Dave Jones, USN

### **Panel 4**

#### **Naval Operational Concepts Beyond the Terror War**

Moderator: Prof. Tom Fedyszyn

Scene-setting brief: The QDR and the Terror War  
(Briefer: CAPT Sam Tangredi)

#### **Members:**

RADM Steve Smith, USN, SECNAV/OPA

RADM Daniel S. Mastagni, USN, SEVENTH FLEET

RDML John C. Harvey, USN, N12

RDML Paul Sullivan, USN, NAVSEA

RDML Christopher M. Moe, USN, N71

Mr. Hank Gaffney, CNA

Dr Edward Liskka, ONR

CAPT Don Inbody, USN, OSD C3I

CAPT Sam Tangredi

CAPT Scott Thomas, USN, N421

CDR John Dickman, USN, SSG

## **List of Participants**

ADM Dennis C. Blair, USN, Commander-In-Chief, US Pacific Command  
CAPT Ronald W. Brinkley, USN, Surface Warfare Officer School  
CAPT Bruce Carter, USN, Naval War College  
ADM Vernon E. Clark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations  
CAPT Tom Crowley, USN, Navy Warfare Development Command  
CDR John Dickmann, USN, Strategic Studies Group, Naval War College  
RADM Robert F. Duncan, U.S. Coast Guard  
ADM William J. Fallon, USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations  
Prof. Tom Fedyszyn, Naval War College  
Mr. Hank Gaffney, Center for Naval Analyses  
RDML John C. Harvey, USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N12  
Prof. Ahmed Hashim, Naval War College  
Prof. Bradd Hayes, Naval War College  
Mr. George Heavey, U.S. Customs Service  
CAPT Don Inbody, USN, Office of the Secretary of Defense, C31  
CAPT Dave Jones, USN, Naval War College  
RDML Charles Johnson, USN, Naval Air Systems Command  
Prof. Peter Liotta, Naval War College  
Dr. Edward Liszka, Office of Naval Research  
RADM Michael F. Lohr, USN, Deputy Judge Advocate General of the Navy, N3/5L  
RADM Daniel S. Mastagni, USN, Commander, SEVENTH FLEET  
VADM Dennis V. McGinn, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Warfare  
Requirements & Programs  
RDML Christopher M. Moe, USN, Director, Navy Missile Defense (N71), Office of the  
Chief of Naval Operations  
The Honorable Alberto Mora, General Counsel of the Navy  
RDML (sel) Robert T. Moeller, USN, U.S. Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, Plans,  
Policy, and Training, U.S. Pacific Fleet, N3/5/7  
VADM Michael G. Mullen, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources,  
Requirements and Assessments, N8  
RADM Charles L. Munns, USN, Commander, Submarine Group EIGHT  
Mr. Ron O'Rourke, Congressional Research Service  
Prof. Mack Owens, Naval War College  
RADM Rodney P. Rempt, USN, President, Naval War College  
RADM Steve Smith, USN, Director, Office of Program Appraisal, Office of Secretary of  
the Navy  
RDML Paul Sullivan, USN, Deputy Commander for Integrated Warfare Systems, Naval  
Undersea Warfare Center  
Prof. Barney Rubel, Naval War College  
Dr. Harvey Sapolsky, Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
Mr. Steve Schlaikjer, Center for Naval Operations/POLAD  
CAPT Bruce Stubbs, U.S. Coast Guard (ret), Anteon

CAPT Sam Tangredi, National Defense University

CAPT Scott Thomas, USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N421

RDML Michael C. Tracy, USN, Commander, Navy Region Northeast/Submarine Group  
TWO

RDML Miles Wachendorf, USN, Director, Strategy and Policy Division, Office of the  
Chief of Naval Operations, N51

Dr. Ken Watman, Naval War College

RADM Harry W. Whiton, USN, Commander, Naval Security Group